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Abstract 
[Excerpt] An uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, following the revolt that overthrew 
Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak three days earlier, began a political crisis that defies resolution. 
Bahrain’s unrest demonstrates that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power and economic 
opportunities were not satisfied by the efforts during 1999-2010 to increase the role of the Shiite majority 
in governance; most Bahraini Shiites now say they seek a constitutional monarchy in which governments 
are established by an elected parliament. Reflecting increasing polarization, many Sunnis in Bahrain 
believe the Shiite majority will settle for nothing less than outright rule. As protests escalated in March 
2011, Bahrain’s government bucked U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance from other Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of emergency, forcefully suppressing demonstrations, 
and arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care workers. Although the state of emergency 
ended on June 1, 2011, the continued imprisonment of dissidents contributed to the resulting failure of a 
“national dialogue,” held in July 2011, to reach on more than just a few political reform recommendations. 
Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent 
Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the 
government’s actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s responses to government proposals 
early in the crisis. The government, through an appointed national commission, has begun to implement 
most of the BICI recommendations, but the stalemate on major political reforms has contributed to the 
resumption of some renewed violent demonstrations and dashed hopes that a complete solution is in 
sight. 
The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime, but it has opposed the 
regime’s use of force against protesters and urged further and faster political reform. The U.S. position on 
Bahrain has been criticized by those who believe the United States is downplaying regime abuses 
because the U.S. security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime is critical to U.S. efforts to contain Iran 
and preserve security in the Persian Gulf more broadly. In exchange for a tacit security guarantee against 
Iran or other aggressors, Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval 
headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for 
U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials are concerned that the instability in Bahrain could 
render U.S. use of the naval headquarters facilities untenable, but there are no evident moves to relocate 
it. Beyond the naval facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has 
designated Bahrain as a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons 
systems. Bahrain also receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance. New U.S. sales and aid are 
coming under criticism from human rights and other groups and, in response, the Administration put on 
hold a significant proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons while approving smaller sales 
of military spare parts. Factoring into the U.S. position is a perception that Iran might seek to take 
advantage of Shiite unrest in Bahrain to reduce U.S. influence and the U.S. military presence in the Persian 
Gulf. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers in initiatives 
to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. 
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain, having largely run out of crude oil reserves, is poorer than 
most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. The country has tried to compensate through diversification, 
particularly with banking and some manufacturing. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain 
signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing itwas signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 
109-169). The unrest in 2011 has further strained Bahrain’s economy. 
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Summary 
An uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, following the revolt that overthrew 
Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak three days earlier, began a political crisis that defies resolution. 
Bahrain’s unrest demonstrates that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power and economic 
opportunities were not satisfied by the efforts during 1999-2010 to increase the role of the Shiite 
majority in governance; most Bahraini Shiites now say they seek a constitutional monarchy in 
which governments are established by an elected parliament. Reflecting increasing polarization, 
many Sunnis in Bahrain believe the Shiite majority will settle for nothing less than outright rule. 
As protests escalated in March 2011, Bahrain’s government bucked U.S. advice by inviting direct 
security assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of 
emergency, forcefully suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and pro-
opposition health care workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, the 
continued imprisonment of dissidents contributed to the resulting failure of a “national dialogue,” 
held in July 2011, to reach on more than just a few political reform recommendations. Hopes for 
resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission 
of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the 
government’s actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s responses to government 
proposals early in the crisis. The government, through an appointed national commission, has 
begun to implement most of the BICI recommendations, but the stalemate on major political 
reforms has contributed to the resumption of some renewed violent demonstrations and dashed 
hopes that a complete solution is in sight.  
The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime, but it has 
opposed the regime’s use of force against protesters and urged further and faster political reform. 
The U.S. position on Bahrain has been criticized by those who believe the United States is 
downplaying regime abuses because the U.S. security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime is 
critical to U.S. efforts to contain Iran and preserve security in the Persian Gulf more broadly. In 
exchange for a tacit security guarantee against Iran or other aggressors, Bahrain has provided key 
support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by 
providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
U.S. officials are concerned that the instability in Bahrain could render U.S. use of the naval 
headquarters facilities untenable, but there are no evident moves to relocate it. Beyond the naval 
facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated 
Bahrain as a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. 
Bahrain also receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance. New U.S. sales and aid are 
coming under criticism from human rights and other groups and, in response, the Administration 
put on hold a significant proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons while 
approving smaller sales of military spare parts. Factoring into the U.S. position is a perception 
that Iran might seek to take advantage of Shiite unrest in Bahrain to reduce U.S. influence and the 
U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with 
but deferred to other GCC powers in initiatives to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.  
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain, having largely run out of crude oil reserves, is 
poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. The country has tried to compensate 
through diversification, particularly with banking and some manufacturing. In September 2004, 
the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it 
was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest in 2011 has further strained Bahrain’s 
economy. 
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The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1 
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the 
leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. The Al Khalifa family’s 
arrival from the Saudi peninsula to take control ended a century of domination by Persian settlers. 
The Al Khalifa subsequently received political protection from Britain, which was the dominant 
power in the Gulf until the early 1970s. Bahrain became independent from Britain in August 1971 
after a 1970 U.N. survey (some refer to its as a “referendum”) determined that its inhabitants 
preferred independence to Iranian control.  
Bahrain is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (about 61 years old), who succeeded his father, 
Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999. Educated at Sandhurst Military 
Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces 
(BDF). His son, Shaykh Salman bin Hamad, about 41 years old, is Crown Prince. Shaykh Salman 
is U.S.-and U.K.-educated and, like the King, has long been considered a proponent of reform 
and accommodation with Bahrain’s Shiite majority—about 60%-70% of the 503,000-person 
citizenry.2 (There are an estimated 235,000 expatriates in Bahrain, according to the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook July 2010 estimate.) About 25% of the population is age 
14 or younger.  
The King’s uncle (the brother of the late ruler), Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, 
has been in position since Bahrain’s independence in 1971, and he is over 80 years old. Along 
with other Sunni hard-liners including Minister of the Royal Court Khalid bin Ahmad bin Salman 
Al Khalifa, 3Interior Minister Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, and Bahrain Defense Forces Chief 
of Staff Duaij bin Salman Al Khalifa, Prime Minister Khalifa has always been skeptical of King 
Hamad’s reforms. He and his allies in the ruling family believe that the concessions that King 
Hamad made to the Shiite majority prior to the 2011 unrest caused the Shiites to increase their 
political demands rather than satisfy them. Others believe that level of unrest reached in February 
2011 would have been reached long ago had the King’s reforms not been enacted.  
To preserve its power, the Al Khalifa family has held onto all strategic ministry positions and at 
least half of all ministerial slots. Even before the 2011 unrest that has seen most senior Shiites in 
government resign, there were only four Shiite ministers out of 23 cabinet positions (plus one out 
of the four deputy prime ministers), and those ministries run by Shiites have been considered less 
critical. Shiites have also been highly underrepresented in the security forces, serving mainly in 
administrative tasks.  
 
                                                                 
1 Much of the information in this section is from State Department reports: 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices (April 8, 2011); the International Religious Freedom Report for July – December 2010 (September 13, 2011); 
and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2011 (June 27, 2011). CRS has no means to independently investigate the 
human rights situation in Bahrain or confirm allegations of specific human rights abuses there.  
2 Government officials dispute that the Shiite community is as large a majority as the 70% figure used in most 
factbooks and academic work on Bahrain. The Shiite community in Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,” 
who are of Arab ethnicity and descended from Arab tribes who inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shiites of 
Persian ethnicity are less numerous, and arrived in Bahrain over the past 400 years. They speak Persian and generally 
do not integrate with the Baharna or with Sunni Arabs.  
3 The name of this official is similar to that of the Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Ahmad bin Mohammad Al Khalifa.  
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The reforms instituted by King Hamad, although well short of the hopes and expectation of the 
Shiite majority when he first took office, are far more extensive than those made by his father 
Amir Isa during his rule. In December 1992, Amir Isa established a 30-member appointed 
Consultative Council to comment on proposed laws. In June 1996, he expanded it to 40 members. 
These reforms did not come close to quieting the demands of either Shiites or Sunnis for the 
restoration of an elected national assembly, even though Bahrain’s Sunnis are considered less 
hungry for “democracy” than are the Shiites. An elected assembly was provided for under the 
1973 constitution but abolished in August 1975 because of fear of sectarian competition and 
tensions over control of the body. In the years just prior to Shaykh Hamad’s accession to 
rulership, there was daily anti-government violence during 1994-1998, although the unrest 
gradually took on a Shiite sectarian character.  
Some Separation of Powers Established by King Hamad 
As Hamad’s first reform steps after taking over, he changed his title to “King,” rather than 
“Amir” and implying more accountability, and held a referendum (February 14, 2002) on a new 
“National Action Charter (including a constitution).” However, the Shiite majority population 
criticized the new constitution because it established that the elected Council of Representatives 
(COR)4 and the all-appointed Shura (Consultative) Council were to be of equal size (40 seats 
each). Together, they constitute a National Assembly (parliament) that serves as only a partial 
check on government power.  
According to the constitution, the King, through the prime minister, makes all cabinet 
appointments and thus exercises direct rule. The National Assembly does not appoint—or have 
power to reject—cabinet appointments. The COR can draft and pass legislation but enactment in 
to law is subject to concurrence by the King. His “veto” can be overridden by a two-thirds 
majority vote of both chambers.  
The COR can, by a two-thirds majority, vote no-confidence against ministers, leading to their 
removal. The COR can also, by a similar super-majority, declare that it cannot “cooperate” with 
the prime minister, but the King subsequently must rule on whether to dismiss the prime minister 
or disband the COR. None of these actions has occurred since the COR was formed. The King 
also has the authority to amend the constitution.  
The Shura Council is formally limited to amending draft legislation and, in concert with the COR, 
reviewing the annual budget, but these powers provide the Shura Council with the ability to block 
action by the COR. The government has tended to appoint generally more educated and pro-
Western members to the Shura Council, and it is generally more supportive of the government 
than is the elected COR. There is no “quota” for females in the National Assembly.  
The National Assembly has tended to address primarily economic and social issues, and not 
national security issues. For example, in May 2010, it voted to ban sale of alcohol to Muslims, 
although subject to implementing regulations made by the King, through the government. Other 
legislation considered in the National Assembly in recent years included bills to combat cyber 
crime, regulate the pharmaceutical sector, regulate the press, create an anti-corruption body, and 
establish a higher council on social security. However, many of these bills stalled in the 2006-
                                                                 
4 This body is also referred to as the Council of Deputies (Majles al-Nawwab).  
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2010 parliament due to lack of consensus and broader Sunni-Shiite tensions, and have remained 
stalled as political crisis engulfed Bahrain in 2011.  
Post-Charter Elections and Political Groups 
Another long-standing disputes between the government and the opposition has been over the 
organization of elections to the COR. Even though the COR has limited powers, the Shiite 
opposition has sought to establish electoral processes that would allow Shiites to translate their 
numbers into political strength. Elections have been held every four years since 2002, each time 
marked by substantial tension over perceived governmental efforts to block achievement of a 
Shiite majority in the COR.  
Formal political parties are banned, but factions compete as “political societies” which serve as 
the functional equivalent of parties for election purposes. The most prominent is Wifaq (formally, 
the Al Wifaq National Islamic Society, also known as the Islamic National Accord Association—a 
large faction, led by Shaykh Ali al-Salman). Waad (“promise”) is a left-leaning secular political 
society whose members are both Sunni and Shiite. One political society (the Bahrain Islamic 
Action Society) is outlawed because it is a successor to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Bahrain (IFLB), a party purportedly linked to Iran that allegedly committed or planned extremist 
actions in the 1980s and 1990s. Another, Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and Democracy), is 
outlawed because of its calls for a change of regime rather than reform. In the COR elections, if 
no candidate in a contested district wins more than 50% in the first round, a runoff is held one 
week later. 
Among exclusively Sunni political societies, there are two that are considered Islamist. They 
include Minbar, mentioned above, which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al Asala, 
which is a harder-line “Salafist” political society. As noted below, in the 2006-2010 parliament, 
Asala and Minbar members held a combined 15 seats. In June 2011, another Sunni grouping 
formed as a response to the Shiite-led 2011 uprising, organized as a pro-government political 
society called the National Unity Gathering/National Unity Association.  
2002 Elections 
The first elections under the Charter were held in October 2002. In the 2002 election, many Shiite 
opposition political societies, including Wifaq, boycotted the elections on the grounds that setting 
the COR and the Shura Council at the same size dilutes popular will. The 2002 boycott lowered 
turnout (about 52%) and helped Sunnis win two-thirds of the 40 COR seats. Of the 170 total 
candidates, 8 were women, but none of the women was elected. 
2006 Elections: Allegations of Gerrymandering and “Importing Sunnis”  
As was widely expected by experts, Sunni-Shiite tensions escalated again in the run-up to the 
November 25, 2006, parliamentary and municipal elections. The tension was aggravated by the 
Shiite perception that a once-repressed Shiite majority came to power in Iraq through U.S.-
backed elections and that the Bahraini majority was entitled to a similar result. In the fall of 2006, 
some Shiites protested, particularly after allegations, some of which were publicly corroborated 
by a government adviser (Salah al-Bandar) in August 2006 in a report to an outside human rights 
organization, that the government was adjusting election districts so as to favor Sunni candidates. 
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It was also alleged that the government issued passports to Sunnis in an attempt to shift the 
demographic balance to the Sunnis’ advantage.  
In the November 2006 elections, two Shiite opposition societies, Wifaq and the National 
Democratic Action Association, participated, raising voter turnout to 72%. Al Haq boycotted. The 
opposition, led by Wifaq, won 17 seats, virtually all those it contested, and became the largest 
single bloc in the COR, although still short of a majority.  
The government was heartened that Sunni Muslims won 23 total seats. Of those, eight were won 
by secular Sunnis and 15 were won by Islamist Sunnis (eight from the Salafists trend and seven 
Muslim Brotherhood members). Only one woman (Latifa al Qaoud, who was unopposed in her 
district) won, out of 18 female candidates (up from 8 in the 2002 elections). As evidence of 
continued friction, Wifaq boycotted the speakership contest, and incumbent COR Speaker Khalifa 
al-Dhahrani was reelected speaker.  
The King subsequently named a new Shura Council with 20 Shiites, 19 Sunnis, and 1 Christian (a 
female). Ten women were appointed. However, the Shiites appointed were not all aligned with 
opposition factions, and several were considered “pro-government.” Therefore, the Shura Council 
was not a bastion of opposition to the government. In a nod to the increased Shiite strength as a 
result of the elections, the government appointed a Shiite (Jawad al-Araidh) as one of the four 
deputy prime ministers and another (who is close to Wifaq) as a minister of state for foreign 
affairs. Three other Shiites remained in the cabinet.  
Heightened political tensions continued in between national elections. In December 2008, the 
government made numerous arrests of Shiite demonstrators and accused some of being part of a 
foreign-inspired “plot” to destabilize Bahrain. Some were accused of undergoing guerrilla or 
terrorist training in Syria. On January 26, 2009, the government arrested three leading Shiite 
activists, including the wheelchair-bound Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace and Mr. Hassan Mushaima, 
both leaders of Al Haq. They were tried during February-March 2009 but, along with other Shiite 
activists, were pardoned and released in April 2009. Alsingace has visited the United States 
several times to highlight the human rights situation in Bahrain. (As noted below, Alsingace was 
arrested again in August 2010. Mushaima subsequently went into exile in Europe. Mushaima was 
arrested after his return and both are on trial in connection with the 2011 unrest.) 
The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election: Prelude to the Uprising 
The resentments over the 2006 election, and the still unfulfilled demand of Bahrain’s Shiites for 
greater political power and an end to economic discrimination, carried over to the 2010 election. 
The election was held on October 23, 2010, with a second round runoff for some districts on 
October 30. There were only a limited number of international observers, primarily from various 
international human rights organizations. Two Bahraini human rights watchdog groups, the 
Bahrain Human Rights Society and the Bahrain Transparency Society, reached agreement to 
jointly monitor the 2010 elections. Municipal elections were held concurrently.  
The electorate was about 300,000 persons, voting in 40 districts spread throughout 5 
governorates. As was the case in the 2006 elections, Shiite oppositionists accused the government 
of drawing district boundaries so as to prevent the election of a Shiite majority. Registration of 
candidates took place during September 12-16, 2010. About 200 people registered to run, of 
whom 7 were women. However, one woman withdrew after registering, leaving a field of six 
female candidates. Of the six, only one was formally endorsed by a political society. Munira 
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy 
 
Congressional Research Service 5 
Fakhro, a prominent Shiite woman who was exiled prior to the political reform process begun by 
King Hamad, was endorsed by Waad. In 2006, she narrowly lost to a Sunni Islamist (Minbar, or 
“platform,” faction). At least four candidates in districts where there was no opposition were 
declared winners by September 28, 2010. One of them was a Wifaq member.  
Wifaq fielded candidates, although its leader, Shaykh Ali Salman, was not a candidate, preferring 
to continue to lead the faction from the background. Candidates linked to Al Haq again boycotted. 
In the run-up to the election, on September 4, 2010, 23 Shiite leaders were arrested on charges of 
attempting a violent overthrow of the government. They were among about 160 Shiites arrested 
in August and September, under a 2006 anti-terrorism law that gives the government broad arrest 
and prosecution powers. Among those arrested was Dr. Alsingace (see above), on August 13, 
2010, upon his return from abroad. A prominent Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Hussein Mirza al-Najati, 
said to be close to the most senior Iraqi Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, had his Bahrain citizenship 
revoked on September 20, 2010.  
Some observers asserted that the government crackdown would drive Bahraini Shiites to 
politically support boycotting harder-line movements, such as Al Haq, and in so doing suppress 
the election turnout among Shiites. The crackdown did not prompt Wifaq to reverse its decision to 
compete. The crackdown might have helped the government’s election strategy but it also led to 
stepped up demonstrations by Shiite youth in Shiite neighborhoods. The tensions are also widely 
blamed for resulting in a bombing that damaged four police cars on September 15, 2010. The 
tensions over the election almost certainly were a catalyst for the major unrest that has occurred 
in February 2011, discussed further below.  
2010 Election Results 
Despite the pre-election tensions, the election was held without major reports of violence. 
Turnout was about 67% between the two rounds. The results, some unexpected, included  
• The increase of Wifaq’s representation to 18 seats, although still not a majority. 
• Unexpected losses by Sunni Islamist factions, reducing their total to 5 seats from 
15. Minbar and Asala each saw dramatic reductions in their seats from 2006: 
Minbar (Muslim Brotherhood) decreased to 2 seats (from 7) and Asala decreased 
to 3 seats (from 8). Most of the seats were picked up by Sunni independents, who 
won 17 seats, up from 9 in the 2006-2010 parliament. Waad won no seats at all. 
These results appeared to represent a rejection of Islamist ideology, and even all 
ideological candidates, in favor of pragmatists who would address Bahrain’s 
economic difficulties.  
• The same one woman won who had won in 2006.  
• In the municipal elections conducted concurrently, one woman was elected in the 
second round—the first woman to be elected to a municipal council.  
In advance of the December 14, 2010, start of the parliamentary term, the King named the 2010-
2014 Shura Council. Thirty of the 40 serving Council members were reappointed, leaving only 10 
newly appointed members. A total of 19 Shiites were appointed, including the speaker, Ali bin 
Salih al-Salih, who was reappointed. The Council has four women, substantially fewer than the 
2006-2010 Council that had nine women. Among the four, one is Jewish (Nancy Khadouri), out 
of a Jewish population in Bahrain of about 40 persons, and one is Christian (Hala Qarrisah). 
Bahrain has an estimated 1,000 Christians.  
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Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly 
 2006  2010  
Post-By-Election 
(October 2011) 
Council of Representatives (COR) 
Wifaq (Shiite Islamist) 17 18 0 
Shiite Independent 0 0 8 
Sunni Independent (mostly 
secular) in COR 8 17 27 
Moderate Sunni Islamist 
(Minbar, Muslim 
Brotherhood) 7 2 2 
Conservative Sunni 
Islamist (Asala, Salafi) 8 3 3 
COR Sect Composition  23 Sunni, 17 Shiite 22 Sunni, 18 Shiite 32 Sunni, 8 Shiite 
Women in COR 1 1 4 
Shura Council (Upper House, appointed) 
Sectarian, Religious 
Composition Upper 
House (Shura Council) 
20 Shiite, 19 Sunni, 1 
Christian 
19 Shiite, 19 Sunni, 1 
Christian, 1 Jew Same as before 
Number of Women 9 4 same 
 
2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis 
King Hamad’s 10-year effort to satisfy Shiite aspirations were demonstrated to have failed when a 
major uprising began on February 14, 2011, in the wake of the success of the uprising in Egypt 
against President Hosni Mubarak. After a few days of protests and relatively minor confrontations 
with the mostly Bahraini Sunni and expatriate Sunni security forces, the mostly Shiite 
demonstrators converged on the interior of a major traffic circle, “Pearl Roundabout,” named 
after a statue that depicted Bahrain’s pearl-diving past. The uprising took place after King Hamad 
had authorized the latest annual iteration of a $2,700 payment to citizens.  
The initial demands of the protesters centered on altering the constitution to expand the powers of 
the COR; ending gerrymandering that prevents Shiites from winning a majority in the COR; 
providing more jobs and economic opportunities; and, among some protesters, replacing hard-line 
Prime Minister Khalifa. These moves would, to the mostly Shiite demonstrators, end the sense 
that they are “second class citizens” or “not trusted” as Bahraini citizens. On February 15, 2011, 
King Hamad spoke to the nation and announced the formation of a committee to investigate the 
use of force against protestors, which had killed two until that time.  
The unrest took on new dimensions in the early morning of February 17, 2011, when security 
forces surrounded the thousands of demonstrators in Pearl Roundabout, many of whom were 
asleep, and used rubber bullets and tear gas to remove them from the location. At least four 
demonstrators were killed; others died subsequently. The government asserted it had warned of 
the impending move, an account disputed by the protesters. At a news conference later on 
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February 17, Foreign Minister Khalid Al Khalifa claimed that the Pearl Roundabout was cleared 
to avoid a “sectarian abyss”—all-out civil conflict between the Shiites and Sunnis. Despite heavy 
security patrols, additional protests took place on February 18, 2011, and security forces 
apparently shot several demonstrators. Wifaq pulled all 18 of its deputies out of the COR 
immediately thereafter. Britain closed its embassy and banned arms exports to Bahrain. 
Government Tactics Change, As Do Protester Demands5 
In part at the reported urging of the United States, the government changed tactics on February 
19, 2011, pulling security forces back from confronting protesters. That day, demonstrators re-
entered Pearl Roundabout and held large demonstrations at or around that location subsequently. 
A February 22, 2011, demonstration was said to be perhaps the largest in Bahrain’s history, 
although some accounts say that a demonstration three days later, which spanned miles of 
downtown roads, was even larger. The February 22 demonstration followed by one day a large 
counter-demonstration by mostly Sunni supporters of the government.  
At the same time, the government, with Crown Prince Salman leading the effort, invited the 
representatives of the protesters to begin a formal dialogue. That effort was supported by a 
gesture by King Hamad on February 22, 2011, to release or pardon 308 Bahrainis, including the 
exiled leader of the hardline Al Haq, Hassan Mushaima (who returned to Bahrain from exile in 
Europe on February 27, 2011). According to the government, these persons were tried not for 
political views, per se, but rather for committing or advocating violence. On February 26, 2011, 
King Hamad dropping two Al Khalifa family members from the cabinet. The posts changed were 
those that can influence job opportunities and living conditions. On March 13, the Crown Prince 
articulated “seven principles” that would guide a national dialogue, and intended to establish a 
“parliament with full authority,” and meet other opposition demands.6  
The pulling back of the security forces, the Crown Prince’s offers of reform, and the cabinet 
reshuffles did not cause the protesters to leave Pearl Roundabout. The government concessions 
exposed long-standing splits in the opposition, such as that between the more moderate Wifaq and 
the more hardline Al Haq. Anger at the government’s initial use of force appeared to shift many 
demonstrators closer to Al Haq, which demanded resignation of the monarchy. Wifaq and other 
more moderate groups still appeared willing to accept the formation of a constitutional monarchy 
and efforts to promote more job opportunities for Shiites. Six smaller hardline Shiite political 
societies reportedly joined Al Haq in insisting on maximalist demands.7 The regime’s offer of 
dialogue was not taken up consistently or systematically by the more moderate groups, and only 
informal meetings took place in search of a political solution.8  
                                                                 
5 The events of the uprising, and the government’s political and security reaction, are examined in substantial detail in 
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report released November 23, 2011. Text of the report is 
at: http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf  
6 BICI report, op. cit., p. 165.  
7 “Bahrain Hard-Liners Call for Royal Family to Go.” Cable News Network website, March 9, 2011.  
8 BICI report, p. 165-66.  
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The Saudi/GCC Intervention and Crackdown 
With no systematic dialogue begun, protests escalated. On March 1, 2011, demonstrators blocked 
the entrance to the parliament building and delayed the meeting of its bodies for six hours. The 
protests also began to spark Sunni-Shiite clashes which some Bahrainis believed were evolving 
into outright sectarian conflict at the mass level. On March 13, 2011, protesters blockaded the 
financial district of the capital, Manama, prompting governmental fears that the unrest could 
choke this major economic sector. Security forces were overwhelmed.  
On March 13, Bahrain requested that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which it is a 
member, send additional security forces to protect key sites. In response to the request, on March 
14, 2011, a GCC force (from the GCC joint Peninsula Shield unit) spearheaded by a reported 
1,200 Saudi forces (in 20 tanks and in other armored vehicles) and 600 UAE police crossed into 
Bahrain and took up positions at key locations in and around Manama. Kuwait sent naval forces 
to help Bahrain secure its maritime borders. On March 15, 2011, King Hamad declared a three-
month state of emergency technically headed by BDF Chief of Staff Marshal Khalifa bin Ahmad 
Al Khalifa, and Bahraini security forces, freed up by the GCC deployment, cleared demonstrators 
from Pearl Roundabout (and demolished the pearl monument itself on March 18, 2011).9 Some 
additional protester deaths were reported in this renewed crackdown. In conjunction, seven 
hardline Shiite leaders were re-arrested, including Al Haq’s Mushaima. The remaining Shiite 
ministers in the cabinet, many of the Shiites in the Shura Council, and many Shiites in other 
senior posts in the judiciary suspended their work in government or resigned outright. Some 
warned that Saudi intervention would prompt a wider conflict by prompting Iranian intervention 
on the side of the Shiite protesters.  
Well before intervening in Bahrain, the GCC states had begun to fear that the Bahrain unrest 
could spread to other GCC states. It was also feared that Iran might be able to exploit the 
situation. None of the other GCC states has a Shiite majority (like Bahrain), but most of them, 
including Saudi Arabia, have substantial Shiite minorities. The GCC states met at the foreign 
minister level on February 16, 2011, and King Hamad had visited Saudi Arabia on February 23, 
2011, for consultations on how to handle the unrest. Crown Prince Salman visited UAE on March 
2, 2011. Those countries arranged for large pledges of aid (some reports mention $20 billion) to 
help Bahrain (and that of Oman, which also faced unrest) create jobs for Shiites.  
Post-GCC Intervention Situation/End of State of Emergency  
Most public protests ceased subsequent to the GCC intervention, although some, mostly 
neighborhood-based demonstrations continue despite a heavy security force presence around 
Manama. Human rights groups, including those testifying at a May 13, 2011, hearing of the Tom 
Lantos Human Rights Commission, reported a broad crackdown in which hundreds were in 
detention, including at least 50 medical professionals who helped tend to injured protestors. Over 
1,500 people, mostly Shiites, had been dismissed from their jobs, although labor movement 
officials say the figure exceeds 2,600. To that date, 30 Bahraini protesters had died in the 
violence, although opposition figures are much higher. Some sources say the government 
bulldozed about 30 Shiite mosques as a measure to prevent Shiites from gathering. 
                                                                 
9 Some accounts differ on the involvement of the Peninsula Shield force, with some observers arguing that members of 
the force have participated directly in suppressing protests, and others accepting the Bahrain/GCC view that the GCC 
force is only guarding key locations and infrastructure.  
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Prominent Dissidents Arrested  
As part of what U.S. officials called an excessive crackdown, in early April 2011, the government 
closed the pro-opposition newspaper Al Wasat; it editor-in-chief, Mansour al-Jamri, went on trial 
on May 18, 2011, for inciting violence. A well-known human rights activist, Bahrain Center for 
Human Rights (BCHR) founder Abdul Hadi al-Khawaja, was arrested April 9, 2011, and his 
daughter, Maryam, a prominent activist, subsequently undertook a hunger strike. On April 15, 
2011, the government announced that Wifaq and another Shiite political society, the Islamic 
Action Association (successor to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, discussed 
below), were being investigated for harming national unity and could potentially be disbanded. 
On May 2, 2011, two Wifaq officials who had resigned from the COR because of the unrest, 
Matar Matar and Jawad Fairuz, were arrested. On May 8, 2011, 14 oppositionists, including 
Mushaima and Alsingace, went on trial before a state security court; 7 others went on trial in 
absentia. On June 23, 2011, Mushaima, Alsingace, and six other hardline Shiite leaders were 
sentenced to life in prison.10 On May 31, an activist considered a main leader of the opposition, 
the current head of the BCHR, Nabeel Rajab, was summoned before the military court 
prosecuting alleged agitators. (On February 19, 2012, Matar was acquitted of all charges; Nabeel 
Rajab was arrested February 15, 2012, for further anti-government activities. Earlier, he was 
injured by security forces during a protest in January 2012.)  
On September 29, 2011, 20 medical personnel were sentenced by a military court to jail time 
ranging from 5 to 15 years, a sentence harshly criticized by human rights activists worldwide. 
The government said the sentences were not for helping protesters medically, but for inciting 
sectarian hatred, possession of illegal weapons, and forcibly occupying a public building. 
Following international criticism, on October 5, 2011, the government announced they would be 
retried in a civilian court.  
Perceiving the regime had gained the upper hand, the King announced in early May that the state 
of emergency would end on June 1, two weeks earlier than scheduled. The government held to 
that schedule; the GCC forces that deployed to Bahrain, including the Kuwaiti naval force, began 
to depart in late June 2011. The departures are believed to be complete. King Hamad spoke to the 
population on May 31 to mark the end of the emergency, offering unconditional dialogue with the 
opposition beginning July 1, 2011. 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) Formed 
On June 29, 2011, as a further gesture toward the opposition, the King named a five-person 
“Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry,” (BICI) headed by highly regarded international 
legal expert Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate the government’s response to the unrest that 
began in February, and to file its report by October 30, 2011. It held a public forum on July 24, 
but came under criticism from Shiite opposition figures who interpreted certain Bassiouni 
statements as a bias in favor of exonerating top government officials. Its report was released on 
November 23, 2011, as discussed further below. 
 
                                                                 
10 Erika Solomon. “Bahrain Sentences 8 Activists to Life Terms.” Washington Post, June 23, 2011.  
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Disputes Over Political Reform: National Dialogue and Results  
The naming of the BICI set the stage for the “National Dialogue” on political and economic 
reform to begin on July 2, 2011, under the chairmanship of speaker of the COR Dhahrani. About 
300 delegates participated, of which the Shiite opposition comprised 40-50 delegates. Of those 
oppositionists, five belonged to Wifaq.11 The dialogue, which was to last several weeks, addressed 
political, economic, social, and human rights issues; each had 15 sub-themes and each sub-theme 
has 90 topics. Senior Bahraini officials said the intent of the dialogue was to outline a vision of 
Bahrain rather than necessarily reach agreement on specific steps. Wifaq’s decision to participate 
was prompted by the government’s release, a few days prior of about 150 of those who had been 
imprisoned for the unrest. 
Still, the continuing detention of many oppositionists did not augur well for progress. The 
prospects further diminished on July 18, 2011, when Wifaq, which had always asserted that it 
would pull out of the talks if and when it became clear that its proposals for a constitutional 
monarchy would not be met, announced its withdrawal. Others took note of the fact that the 
Crown Prince, the principal champion of dialogue within the upper ranks of the regime, did not 
chair the dialogue. This suggests he remains in eclipse by harder line Al Khalifa members allied 
with the prime minister.  
The dialogue concluded in late July 2011 after reaching consensus on a few recommendations, 
which were endorsed by the government on July 29. The core of the recommendations, which 
were relatively close to the “seven principles” articulated by the Crown Prince in March 2011, 
were:  
• an elected parliament (lower house) with expanded powers, including the power 
to confirm or reject a nominated cabinet; the power to confirm or veto the 
government’s four year work plan; the right to discuss any agenda item; and the 
power for the full COR to question ministers on their performance or plans. In 
addition, the chairman of the National Committee that presides over the National 
Assembly should be derived from among the elected COR, not the Shura 
Council.  
• a government “reflecting the will of the people.”  
• “fairly” demarcated electoral boundaries. 
• reworking of laws on naturalization and citizenship. 
• combating financial and administrative corruption. 
• efforts to reduce sectarian divisions.  
• There were reportedly 82 economic recommendations, including new 
mechanisms to provide food subsidies to only the most needy citizens.  
In part as a gesture of reconciliation after the Dialogue concluded, on August 8 the government 
released the two jailed Wifaq COR deputies Matar and Fairuz, along with several other jailed 
activists. In a speech on August 28, 2011, near the conclusion of the holy month of Ramadan, 
                                                                 
11 Mohamed Hasni. “Bahrain Opens Dialogue Buoyed by Shiite Attendance.” Agence France Presse, July 2, 2011.  
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King Hamad announced the pardoning of some protesters, and the reinstatement of some of the 
approximately 2,700 of those who had been fired for alleged participation in unrest.  
Implementation, Potential Compromises, and Alternative Outcomes  
The government subsequently appointed a committee to implement the recommendations, headed 
by former Foreign Minister and now deputy Prime Minister Muhammad Mubarak Al Khalifa. He 
and other officials conducted rounds of meetings with both houses of the National Assembly and 
with government ministries to begin implementation.  
The government began drafting amendments to the Bahraini constitution to implement the 
consensus recommendations. The proposed amendments were announced by the King on January 
16, 2012, including provisions to implement the recommendations of the National Dialogue on 
enhancing the powers of the COR, discussed above. In addition, according to the proposed 
constitutional amendments: 
• There will be limitations on the power of the King to appoint the members of the 
Shura Council and to dissolve the COR. 
• Either chamber of the Assembly will be able to draft legislation or constitutional 
amendments.  
• The COR will be allowed to question Ministers and the government’s work 
agenda, without the concurrence of the Shura Council.  
The opposition immediately rejected the King’s announced amendments as insufficient. The 
amendments do not create a fully elected parliament with legislative powers, or provide for the 
direct selection of the prime minister by the largest coalition in the elected legislature. The 
opposition views the pledge of “fairly demarcated” election boundaries as vague, and likely to 
enable the government to continue to gerrymander districts to ensure a Sunni majority in the 
lower house. On October 12, 2011, in an announcement called the “Manama Document,“ several 
opposition parties, led by Wifaq and Waad, called for a elections to be run by an independent 
election commission, and for the National Assembly to consist of a single chamber, all elected, 
legislature.  
Other ideas for interim political compromises have repeatedly failed to come to fruition. A widely 
discussed interim compromise has been the replacement of Prime Minister Khalifa, who is widely 
despised by the opposition, with Wifaq leader Shaykh Ali Salman or another moderate opposition 
figure. The government has not agreed to this step even though, throughout the crisis, some 
Bahrainis have said that the dismissal of Prime Minister Khalifa Al Khalifa was likely.12 Another 
interim compromise, not adopted to date, could include a broad reshuffling of the cabinet to give 
Shiites many more ministerial posts and control of key economic ministries. Wifaq already holds 
the majority of seats on several elected municipal councils, although these bodies do not have 
national legislative authority.  
Some believe the GCC intervention and subsequent crackdown hardened Shiite demands to the 
point where implementation of the national dialogue consensus recommendations will be 
dismissed and any further compromise is difficult. Harder line Shiite groups believe that no 
                                                                 
12 Author conversations with representatives of and observers close to the regime. April 2011.  
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compromise is possible with the Al Khalifa regime still in power, and that increased protests and 
actions intended to collapse the economy will force the government to fall. The overthrow of the 
government and the ascension of a Shiite-led regime is possible, although the GCC determination 
to prevent this makes this outcome less likely, at least in the short term. On the regime side, 
compromise has been made more difficult by the apparent political eclipse of the Crown Prince, 
who favors dialogue and negotiation, and the ascendancy within the regime of the prime minister 
and other hardliners.  
September 24-October 1 Special Election  
Following the conclusion of the National Dialogue—but before the issuing of the BICI report on 
the government handling of the unrest—there was a special elections to fill the seats vacated by 
the 18 Wifaq COR deputies that had resigned at the outset of the unrest. The elections were 
scheduled for September 24, 2011, with a second round to be held on October 1, if needed. 
However, the legitimacy of the special elections was clouded by the announcement by Wifaq on 
August 14, 2011, that it would boycott the elections. That position was based on Wifaq’s decision 
that the national dialogue’s reform recommendations were not sufficiently extensive. Several anti-
government demonstrations took place in the run-up to the elections and on the days of the 
election, mostly in Shiite neighborhoods.  
In advance of the elections, four winners were declared (including one woman) because they 
were running unopposed. In both rounds of voting, turnout was assessed as very low, at about 
20%, although the government put out official turnout figures of close to 50%. After the first 
round on September 24, five additional seats were decided. The October 1 runoff decided the 
remaining nine seats. As shown in Table 1, of the 18 seats decided in the special election, 10 were 
won by Sunnis, largely because of the Wifaq boycott and low turnout. This suggests that most 
Shiites viewed the special election as illegitimate, but the net result is that Sunnis now 
overwhelmingly dominate the COR, with 32 seats to only 8 Shiite seats. The special election 
resulted in the addition of three women COR deputies.  
BICI Report on Handling of the Unrest: Reaction and Implementation  
The next major benchmark in the crisis was the release of the BICI report. It was initially due by 
October 30 but, because of the large number of interviews conducted by the BICI, was delayed 
until November 23, 2011. Although the focus of the BICI was on the handling of the unrest - and 
not on competing ideas for political reform - the release was viewed by both the government and 
the opposition as a pivotal moment in the crisis. The 500+ page report provided some support for 
the narratives of both sides in the crisis, and recommendations, including:13 
• There was “systematic” and “deliberate” use of excessive force, including torture 
and forced confessions, against protesters.  
• The opposition articulated additional demands as the uprising progressed. 
• The government did not provide evidence to the BICI that established a link 
between the unrest in Bahrain and the government of Iran. (P.378) 
                                                                 
13 http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf 
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•  The BICI did not find evidence of human rights abuses committed by the GCC 
forces that deployed at the request of Bahrain’s government. (p.378). 
• The BICI’s recommendations (pp. 411-415) are generally confined to measures 
that would prevent future violence against peaceful protesters, and to investigate 
the abuses committed and compensate victims. In keeping with the BICI’s 
mandate, the recommendations do not address the political structure of Bahrain.  
BICI Report Reactions/Implementation by a National Commission  
Apparently recognizing that it would be judged by the international community on its response to 
the report, King Hamad issued a statement the day of the report’s release, accepting its criticisms 
of the government and promising implementation of its recommendations. Wifaq cheered those 
parts of the report that support its accounts but criticized it as failing to state that abuse of 
protesters were deliberate government policy and refused to participate in cooperation with the 
government on specific implementation steps. The bulk of the opposition, including Wifaq, 
expressed skepticism that the recommendations would be fully implemented.  
Government implementation of at least some of the recommendations began after the report was 
released. On November 26, 2011, King Hamad issued a royal order to establish a 19-member 
national commission to implement the recommendations, chaired by Shura Council speaker Ali 
al-Salih (a Shiite). He also announced that the “National Human Rights Institution,” appointed in 
2010, would be fully independent of the government. Other specific steps taken during December 
2011 – February 2012 include: 
• Referral of all cases of security personnel who committed major abuses to the 
Public Prosecutor, for subsequent prosecution. 
• Abolition of the military court system and transfer of all cases to ordinary courts.  
• Establishment of new procedures to record interrogations of detainees. 
• The National Security Agency was stripped of law enforcement powers and is to 
remain purely an intelligence gathering agency.  
• Creation by the minister of labor of a tripartite commission to address reinstating 
fired workers, and public sector employees dismissed for exercising their rights 
of speech have been reinstated. 
• A code of conduct for the police has been drafted, based on international best 
practices. The government has hired former Miami police chief John Timoney 
and former British police chief John Yates to teach Bahraini police tactics and 
techniques that conform to international standards of human rights practices. 
• Establishment of a compensation fund for the victims of torture.  
• The rebuilding of some of the demolished religious sites has begun.  
The implementation of the BICI recommendations, completed to varying degrees to date, has 
failed to calm unrest. Activists say man activist remain indetention, and many workers have not 
been rehired. During Since mid-December 2011, protesters have attempted to occupy the large 
Budaiya highway or conduct other demonstrations, leading to clashes with police and a few 
protester deaths. On December 24, security forces fired at Wifaq headquarters after it challenged a 
ban on its weekly protests. On December 21, 2011, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
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Navi Pillay called on the government to release all those detained for peacefully demonstrating. 
More recently, security forces confronted protesters who tried to march to Pearl Roundabout to 
mark the February 14, 2012, first anniversary of the uprising. Earlier, the December 19-20 
summit of GCC leaders sided firmly with the government in its final communiqué,14 not 
expressing any criticism of Bahrain’s actions. Since March 2011, about 20 protesters have been 
killed at the hands of security forces, adding to the approximately 30 killed during February – 
March 2011.  
The BICI is to issue a final report evaluating how far its recommendations were carried out, and 
will set out a timetable for completing implementation of those recommendations not fully 
implemented to date. That report was to be submitted to the government by the end of February 
2012, but reports say it will be delayed until early March 2012.  
U.S. Posture on the Uprising  
The U.S. response to the unrest in Bahrain has been colored by the vital U.S. security interests in 
Bahrain, and has been largely consistent through all the various phases of the unrest. One major 
U.S. concern is that a fall of the Al Khalifa regime and ascension of a Shiite-led government 
could increase Iran’s influence and lead to an unwanted loss of the U.S. use of Bahrain’s military 
facilities. The seeming priority of these considerations to have prompted human rights 
organizations, Bahrain’s opposition, and other regional governments to assert that the United 
States applies different standards to allied countries than it does to countries in which a change of 
regime might benefit U.S. interests, such as Syria.  
The Administration has not called for the Al Khalifa to yield to a political transition, but the 
Administration stresses that it has been highly critical of Bahrain’s use of force against protesters. 
It adds that the use of force has been dramatically less severe than that used by Muammar 
Qadhafi in Libya and Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and that the Bahrain government has a long 
record of reform that needs to be factored into the U.S. response.  
Among other specific U.S. actions, in phone calls to their counterparts after the February 17, 
2011, clearing of Pearl Roundabout, Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates 
reportedly expressed concern to the Bahrain government for using force against the protesters. 
These contacts reportedly contributed to the government decision to exercise restraint at that time. 
Just prior to the GCC intervention and subsequent crackdown, Secretary of State Clinton and 
other U.S. officials called on all parties to take up the offer by the Crown Prince for a broad 
political dialogue on reform.15 President Obama praised the February 26, 2011, cabinet reshuffle 
and King Hamad’s restatements of his commitment to reform.16  
The U.S. position did not change substantially following the GCC intervention, but the United 
States did become somewhat more critical as the subsequent crackdown intensified. U.S. officials 
expressed the view that the crackdown would further inflame unrest over the long term, rather 
than achieve quiescence and stability. On March 19, 2011, Secretary Clinton reiterated the U.S. 
support for the Crown Prince’s offer of dialogue, and said: 
                                                                 
14 http://www.mofa.gov.ae/mofa_english/portal/ce82246d-b509-49cc-aa0c-5d205d87cae5.aspx 
15 Secretary of State Clinton Comments on the Situation in the Middle East. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
GbucMZUg3Gc. 
16 “Obama Welcomes Bahrain Cabinet Reshuffle.” Reuters, February 27, 2011.  
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Bahrain obviously has the sovereign right to invited GCC forces into its territory under its 
defense and security agreements…. [The United States has] made clear that security alone 
cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain. As I said earlier this week, violence is not and 
cannot be the answer. A political process is. We have raised our concerns about the current 
measures directly with Bahraini officials and will continue to do so. 
On April 30, 2011, according to the White House, President Obama spoke by phone to King 
Hamad and reportedly stated that Bahrain’s stability depends on respect for the universal rights of 
the people of Bahrain, and a process of meaningful reform. At a May 5, 2011, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee hearing, State Department officials testified that the United States is “deeply 
concerned” by the “campaign of retribution” against the political opposition, adding that “security 
operations will not resolve the challenges Bahrain faces.” The United States advised King Hamad 
not to visit the United States in May 2011 to attend his son’s college graduation. The 
Administration did not send an official to testify at a May 13, 2011 Tom Lantos Human Rights 
Commission hearing. Outgoing Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, along with Feltman 
and an NSC official, visited on May 17, 2011, meeting with senior Bahraini officials and again 
urging them to try to start dialogue with the opposition. Some believe the government did not 
adequately protect a U.S. diplomat in Manama responsible for human rights issues, Ludovic 
Hood. The State Department returned him to the United States in June 2011 because of perceived 
threats from Bahrainis who felt he was too critical of the government. 
President Obama’s May 19, 2011, speech on the uprisings in the Middle East was critical of 
Bahrain, saying that the prospects for success of a dialogue with the opposition are compromised 
by the jailing of opposition figures. This U.S. position was restated in separate June 7, 2011, 
meetings between the Crown Prince and Secretary Clinton and President Obama. According to a 
White House statement, President Obama stressed to the Crown Prince that those Bahraini forces 
or officials responsible for human rights abuses should be held “accountable.”  
The criticism continued in the course of the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York in 
September 2011; in his September 21, 2011, speech to the body, President Obama said: 
In Bahrain, steps have been taken toward reform and accountability. We’re pleased with that, 
but more is required. America is a close friend of Bahrain, and we will continue to call on the 
government and the main opposition bloc—the Wifaq—to pursue a meaningful dialogue that 
brings peaceful change that is responsive to the people. We believe the patriotism that binds 
Bahrainis together must be more powerful than the sectarian forces that would tear them 
apart. It will be hard, but it is possible. 
The same day, the Ambassador-nominee to Bahrain, Thomas Krajeski, testified in confirmation 
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In his testimony, he reiterated 
Administration criticisms of the government response, saying the government “overreacted” to 
the unrest. He also praised the government’s long record of reform and accommodation of some 
Shiite demands.  
Many experts awaited the Administration reaction to the BICI report as a harbinger of the 
direction of U.S. policy toward Bahrain. However, the U.S. reaction, consistent with the U.S. 
stance since the crisis began, gave support to the views of both the government and the 
opposition, and did not signal a major shift in U.S. policy. Reacting to the BICI report, Secretary 
of State Clinton said the day of the release that the United States is: 
deeply concerned about the abuses identified in the report…and believe[s] that the BICI 
report offers a historic opportunity for all Bahrainis to participate in a healing process that 
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will address long-standing grievances and move the nation onto a path of genuine, sustained, 
reform.  
During December 15, 2011, less than a month after the BICI report, Assistant Secretary of State 
(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) Michael Posner made his third visit to Bahrain 
since the unrest began. Suggesting that the Administration sees the government of Bahrain as 
attempting to implement the BICI recommendations, he repeated past criticisms but also 
“condemned” the use of violence by demonstrators “which the government has an obligation to 
stop.” He made his fourth visit on February 9, 2012, praising implementation of the BICI 
recommendations but also saying more needs to be done, such as the refusal of the government to 
drop some pending criminal charges against detainees incarcerated for political expression.  
The Obama Administration, which presented its FY2012 budget request on February 14, 2011, 
just as the unrest in Bahrain was growing, has not discontinued military and anti-terrorism 
assistance or arms sales to Bahrain. However, some of this aid and sales remain on hold or are at 
reduced levels from what was expected before the unrest began. For example, military aid was 
cut from the amounts requested when the budget for FY2012 was submitted ($25 million in 
Foreign Military Financing was requested, $10 million is being provided). No further changes 
were evident in the FY2013 budget presented on February 13, 2012, but the military aid request 
for Bahrain remains at the reduced level estimated for the full FY2012. In addition, a new sale of 
arms to Bahrain, announced in September 2011, was subsequently put on hold pending the 
outcome of the BICI report. The entire sale has incurred strong objections from human rights 
activists, even though part of it would include equipment that would not likely be used against 
protesters. Levels of those sales and aid are discussed in the sections below.  
Pre-2011 U.S. Posture on Bahraini Democracy and Human Rights 
Well before the 2011 unrest began, successive U.S. Administrations have been accused by human 
rights groups and Bahraini Shiites of downplaying abuses against Bahrain’s Shiite community. 
Critics point to Secretary of State Clinton’s comments in Bahrain on December 3, 2010, referring 
to the October 2010 elections, saying: “I am impressed by the commitment that the government 
has to the democratic path that Bahrain is walking on. It takes time; we know that from our own 
experience.”17  
On the other hand, for many years prior to the 2011 unrest, the United States has sought to 
accelerate political reform in Bahrain and to empower its political societies through several 
programs. The primary vehicle has been the “Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI),” which 
began funding programs in Bahrain in 2003. MEPI funds have been used to help Bahrain build an 
independent judiciary, to strengthen the COR, to empower women, to conduct media training, and 
to promote legal reform. MEPI funds have also been used to fund AFL-CIO projects with 
Bahraini labor organizations, and to help Bahrain implement the U.S.-Bahrain FTA. In May 2006 
Bahrain revoked the visa for the resident program director of the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI), and did not allow the office to reopen. NDI was conducting programs to enhance 
parliamentary capabilities through a local NGO. In February 2010, the MEPI office of State 
Department signed a memorandum of understanding with Bahrain to promote entrepreneurship 
there and promote opportunities for trade with U.S. small businesses. According to the State 
Department’s International Religious Freedom report for July-December 2010 (September 13, 
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2011), “The U.S. government discusses religious freedom with the [Bahraini] government as part 
of its overall policy to promote human rights.”  
Other Human Rights Issues 
Many of the general human rights issues are directly tied to the schism between the Sunni-led 
regime and the Shiite majority, as noted in U.S. government reports on human rights and religious 
freedom in Bahrain. Beyond that issue, State Department reports, such as the human rights report 
for 2010, note problems for non-Muslims and for opponents of the government. Bahrain allows 
freedom of worship for Christians, Jews, and Hindus although the constitution declares Islam the 
official religion. It should be noted that the State Department human rights report, released April 
5, 2011, covers the period of calendar year 2010 and does not address the government response to 
the 2011 unrest.  
There are several Bahraini human rights groups, mainly advocates for Shiite rights and causes. As 
noted above, two of the most prominent such groups are the Bahrain Human Rights Society and 
the Bahrain Transparency Society. Another is the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, founded by 
Abdul Hadi al-Khawaja, who is serving a life sentence for opposition activities.  
 Women’s Rights 
Bahrain has tended to be relatively progressive as far as law and regulations. However, as is the 
case with its neighbors, Bahrain’s practices and customs tend to limit women’s rights. Women can 
drive, own and inherit property, and initiate divorce cases, although religious courts may refuse a 
woman’s divorce request. Some prominent women are campaigning for a codified family law that 
would enhance and secure women’s rights, running into opposition from Bahraini clerics who are 
against granting more rights for women. The campaign for the law is backed by King Hamad’s 
wife, Shaykha Sabeeka, and the Supreme Council for Women, which is the preeminent 
association that promotes women’s rights in Bahrain.  
To try to showcase its progressiveness, the government has promoted several women to high 
positions. The number of women in both chambers of the National Assembly are provided in 
Table 1, above. Since 2005, there have been two female ministers—Minister of Human Rights 
and Social Development Fatima bint Ahmad al-Balushi and Minister of Information and Culture 
Mai bint Muhammad Al Khalifa. A previous female minister of health, Nada Haffadh, resigned in 
October 2007 following allegations of corruption in her ministry by conservatives who oppose 
women occupying high-ranking positions. Two other women, including the president of the 
University of Bahrain, have ministerial rank. Ms. Huda Azar Nunu, an attorney and formerly the 
only Jew in the Shura Council, is ambassador to the United States.  
Religious Freedom 
On freedoms for religions other than Islam, the July-December 2011, State Department report on 
international religious freedom, in the section on Bahrain, says that respect for religious freedom 
exhibited “no change” since the prior report. Most of the report focuses on Sunni-Shiite 
differences, which are discussed as political issues above. According to the report, non-Muslims 
have been able to practice their religion privately without government interference, and to 
maintain places of worship. However, the government requires licenses for churches to operate, 
and has in the past threatened to shutter un-licensed churches serving Indian expatriates. The 
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Baha’i faith, declared blasphemous in Iran and Afghanistan, has been discriminated against in 
Bahrain, although recent State Department human rights reports say that the Baha’i community 
now gathers and operates openly.  
Labor Rights 
On labor issues, Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law 
granting workers, including noncitizens, the right to form and join unions. The law holds that the 
right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests, but their right 
is restricted in practice, including a prohibition on strikes in the oil and gas, education, and health 
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain. The Shura Council has vetoed a proposed law 
that would have authorized formation of more than one union per company. All unions must join 
the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU).  
Human Trafficking 
On human trafficking, the State Department “Trafficking in Persons Report” for 2011, released 
June 27, 2011, keeps Bahrain’s placement at Tier 2, on the grounds that it is investigating and 
prosecuting forced prostitution cases and convicted nine trafficking offenders during the reporting 
period. This is the same ranking Bahrain had following release of the 2010 Trafficking in Persons 
Report (June 14, 2010), when the “Watch List” designation was dropped. The 2009 report (June 
16, 2009) assessed Bahrain as “Tier 2 - Watch List,” with explanatory language similar to that of 
the 2008 report. That report had elevated Bahrain to Tier 2 Watch List, from the Tier 3 ranking 
(worst level) of the 2007 report.  
Executions and Torture 
Another issue that predated the 2011 unrest is that of executions. Human Rights Watch and other 
groups asserted that Bahrain is going against the international trend to end execution. In 
November 2009, Bahrain’s Court of Cassation upheld the sentencing to death by firing squad of a 
citizen of Bangladesh. That sentenced was imposed for a 2005 murder. From 1977 until 2006, 
there were no executions in Bahrain.  
Allegations of torture against Shiite opposition figures are widespread.18 Witnesses at the May 13, 
2011, hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission asserted that torture was being used 
regularly on those arrested in the post-GCC intervention crackdown. The Administration did not 
send a witness to testify at that hearing.  
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations19 
U.S.-Bahrain relations are long-standing, intimate, and mutually reinforcing, raising the stakes for 
the United States in the unrest that has occurred there during 2011. The opposition says that U.S.-
                                                                 
18 Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Torture Redux.” February 2010.  
19 Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
(DSCA). 
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Bahrain defense relations are not at risk should the Shiite opposition achieve greater influence in 
Bahrain; Wifaq leader Shaykh Salman has said in interviews that he supports continuing the 
security relationship with the United States.  
A U.S. Embassy in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, opened in September 1971 in conjunction with 
Bahrain’s independence. At that time, the threat level in the Persian Gulf was perceived as 
relatively low. Since then, defense issues have become a central feature of U.S.-Bahrain relations. 
Although Iraq is no longer a strategic threat to the region because it cannot project power outside 
its borders, Iran’s nuclear program is considered a growing threat to the Persian Gulf states, 
including Bahrain. There is also the issue of terrorism and piracy in the Gulf, as exemplified by a 
July 28, 2010, explosion on a Japanese oil tanker in that waterway. The explosion is widely 
suspected to have been a terrorist attack, and a faction linked to Al Qaeda (Abdullah Azzam 
Brigades) claimed responsibility.  
In large part to keep powerful neighbors in check, Bahrain has long linked its security to the 
United States, and U.S. efforts to address threats in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan have benefitted 
from access to Bahraini facilities. In recognition of the relationship, in March 2002, President 
Bush (Presidential Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally 
(MNNA),” a designation that facilitates U.S. arms sales. 
U.S. Navy Headquarters in Bahrain 
The cornerstone of U.S.-Bahrain defense relations is U.S. access to Bahrain’s naval facilities. 
February 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain; 
MIDEASTFOR (U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S. 
Central Command), as well as the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) are headquartered 
there, at a sprawling facility called “Naval Support Activity-Bahrain.” The facility now covers 
over 100 acres, and about 5,000 U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, are deployed in Bahrain, a number 
likely not to fluctuate substantially now that U.S. troops have withdrawn from Iraq.20 Some 
smaller U.S. ships (minesweepers) are docked there, but the Fifth Fleet also consists of a Carrier 
Battle Group, an Amphibious Ready Group, and various other ships that are afloat or which dock 
elsewhere in the region.  
To further develop the naval facility (sometimes referred to as “Bahrain Island”), and other 
military facilities, the U.S. military is implementing a planned $580 million military construction 
program in Bahrain. Construction began in May 2010 to allow larger ships to dock at the naval 
facility; the project is expected to be completed, in several phases, by 2015. A January 2008 lease 
agreement between the United States and Bahrain allowed for the expansion by making available 
the decommissioned Mina (port) Salman. The bulk of the construction program is to expand the 
naval facility, but $45 million of the funds is to be used to expand an apron at Shaykh Isa Air 
Base and $19 million is to be used for a Special Operations Forces facility. Recent appropriations 
and requests to fund the construction include $54 million for FY2008 (Division 1 of P.L. 110-
161); no funds for FY2009; $41.5 million for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117); $258 million for FY2011 
(Bahrain. P.L. 112-10); and $100 million was requested for FY2012 for two projects of nearly 
equal size. A Senate version of H.R. 2055 had cut the entire FY2012 request, possibly because of 
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the unrest and the uncertainty created by it, and the cuts were contained in the final version of 
H.R. 2055, which was enacted as the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 112-74).  
Some say that the United States should begin examining alternate facilities in the Gulf region in 
the expectation that continued Bahraini hosting of the U.S. naval headquarters has become 
unstable. On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Navy in Bahrain issued a statement refuting a British press 
report that the Navy is planning to relocate the facility. Should there be a decision to take that 
step, likely alternatives would include UAE or Qatar, although neither has expressed a position on 
whether it would be willing to host such an expanded facility.  
Defense Pact and Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan 
Bahrain was part of the U.S.-led allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, hosting 
17,500 troops and 250 combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base (mentioned above). Expanding on 
the agreement under which Bahrain hosted U.S. naval headquarters, Bahrain and the United 
States signed a 10-year defense pact on October 28, 1991, seven months after the ousting of Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait. The pact was renewed in October 2001, and was presumably to be up for 
renewal in October 2011. However, press and expert accounts in August 2011 indicate that, a few 
months after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the Bush Administration may 
have extended the pact a further five years, to 2016. The U.S. Defense Department has not 
publicly confirmed these stories, although one U.S. official, on background, said the pact was 
previously extended beyond October 2011.21 The pact not only provides the United States access 
to Bahrain’s air bases and to pre-position strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force munitions), 
but also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and it expanded exercises 
and U.S. training of Bahraini forces.22  
Following the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991, there were about 1,300 U.S. military 
personnel in Bahrain during the 1990s to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Bahraini pilots flew 
strikes over Iraq during the war; Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during the war, of which 
three hit facilities there. Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in 
Iraq during 1991-1998, and the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced a 
U.N. embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003. Since the early 1990s, the United States has reportedly 
stationed two Patriot anti-missile batteries there.23 
Post-September 11 and Post-Saddam Cooperation 
The naval headquarters, mentioned earlier, has been used to coordinate the operations of over 20 
U.S. warships performing support missions for U.S. and allied naval operations related to the U.S. 
military operations in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001- ). These ships are part of 
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the movement of terrorists, arms, 
                                                                 
21 “U.S.-Bahrain Defense Pact Renewed.” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2011.  
22 Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S. 
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 
2002, p. 27. 
23 Walter Pincus. “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Washington Post, February 22, 
2011.  
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or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and narcotics across the Arabian Sea. 
These task forces also seek to counter piracy in the Arabia Sea. In March 2008, Bahrain took a 
turn in a rotation to command CTF-152, and it commanded again in December 2010. Bahrain 
commanded an anti-piracy task force in Gulf/Arabian Sea waters in October 2010. These 
operations are offshoots of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, which ousted the 
Taliban after the September 11 attacks. Bahrain allowed the United States to fly combat missions 
from its bases (Shaykh Isa Air Base) in both OEF and the war to oust Saddam Hussein in March-
April 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). During both OEF and OIF, Bahrain publicly 
deployed its U.S.-supplied frigate warship (the Subha) to help protect U.S. ships, and it sent 
ground and air assets to Kuwait in support of OIF. Bahrain hosted about 4,000 U.S. military 
personnel during major combat of OEF (October 2001-May 2003).  
Bahrain and UAE have been the only Gulf states to deploy their own forces to provide aid to 
Afghanistan. In January 2009, Bahrain sent 100 police officers to Afghanistan on a two-year tour 
to help U.S./NATO-led stabilization operations there. Their tour reportedly has been extended.  
Bahrain’s participation in OIF came despite domestic opposition in Bahrain to that war. Because 
of its limited income, Bahrain has not contributed funds to Iraq reconstruction, but it attended the 
“Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process which last met in Kuwait on April 22, 
2008. That process was suspended in late 2008 as Iraq stabilized and the United States began the 
process of withdrawal, complete on December 18, 2011. On October 16, 2008, Bahrain’s first 
post-Saddam ambassador to Iraq (Saleh Ali al-Maliki) presented his credentials in Baghdad, in 
line with King Hamad’s pledge to President Bush in March 2008. Saudi Arabia has still not 
established a full embassy in Iraq, in part due to differences between Saudi Arabia and the Shiite-
led government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.  
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid 
To assist Bahrain’s ability to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues, 
Congress and successive Administrations, citing Bahrain’s limited income, have supported 
military assistance to Bahrain’s small force. The main recipient of such assistance is the relatively 
small Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), which has about 13,000 personnel (plus about 1,200 
National Guard). The BDF and the police are run by Sunni Bahrainis, but are said to supplement 
their ranks with unknown percentages of paid Sunni Muslim recruits from neighboring countries, 
including Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Until 1998, Bahrain’s internal security 
services were run by a former British colonial police officer, Ian Henderson, who had a reputation 
among Shiites for using repressive measures. The current director of the internal security service 
is Shaykh Khalifa bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, considered a hardliner in the royal family.  
Bahrain is eligible to receive grant “excess defense articles” (EDA). The United States transferred 
the FFG-7 “Perry class” frigate Subha (see above) as EDA in July 1997. According to the State 
Department’s FY2012 budget request, the U.S. Navy is supporting providing another frigate (an 
“extended deck frigate”) to Bahrain as EDA because the Subha is approaching the end of its 
service life. In 1996, the United States gave Bahrain a no-cost five-year lease on 60 M60A3 
tanks; title subsequently passed to Bahrain. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was suspended for 
Bahrain in FY1994 but restarted in appreciation of Bahrain’s support in OEF and OIF.  
Recent FMF (and funds provided under “Section 1206” of the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 2006, P.L. 109-163), have been provided to help Bahrain maintain U.S.-origin weapons, to 
enhance inter-operability with U.S. forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to support and 
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upgrade the avionics of its F-16 fleet, and to improve counter-terrorism capabilities. As an 
example, the United States has supplied Bahrain with a coastal radar system that reportedly 
provides Bahrain and the U.S. Navy a 360-degree field of vision around Bahrain.24 Some funds 
have been used to build up Bahrain’s Special Operations forces. The Defense Department 
estimates that, in part due to U.S. assistance, as of FY2008, about 45% of Bahrain’s forces are 
fully capable of integrating into a U.S.-led coalition. The FY2012 request, made at the start of the 
unrest, asked for $25 million in FMF; as shown in the table below, only $10 million is likely to be 
provided for FY2012, due in large part to the Administration’s intent to retain leverage against 
Bahrain to compel it make reforms, and to signal that it is making the government pay a price for 
its abuses against protesters.  
As noted in Table 3, small amounts of International Military Education and Training funds 
(IMET) are provided to Bahrain to inculcate principles of civilian control of the military, 
democracy, and interoperability with U.S. forces. During FY2010, 26 Bahraini students attended 
U.S. military schools.  
Purchases With National Funds  
Despite its limited funds (Bahrain’s total government budget was about $6 billion in 2009), 
Bahrain has purchased some U.S. systems. In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10 U.S.-made F-16Cs 
from new production, worth about $390 million. In 1999, the United States sold Bahrain 26 
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to arm the F-16s, although some 
Members were concerned that the AMRAAM sale could promote an arms race in the Gulf. 
Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the 
only Gulf state eligible to receive the STINGER shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the 
United States has sold Bahrain about 70 Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been 
repeated in subsequent legislation.) To allay congressional concerns about possible U.S. 
promotion of missile proliferation in the region, an August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile 
Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket 
launcher) included an agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. (A notification of 
a possible sale to Bahrain of 30 ATACM missiles and associated equipment, valued at about $70 
million, was sent to Congress on November 4, 2010. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for 
the missiles.) 
Among recent sales notified to Congress by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
are: 180 “Javelin” anti-armor missiles and 60 launch units, worth up to $42 million; nine UH-
60M Blackhawk helicopters worth up to $252 million; six Bell search and recovery helicopters, 
valued at about $160 million, notified August 3, 2007; up to 25 AMRAAMs (Raytheon Missile 
Systems Corp.) and associated equipment, valued at about $74 million, notified on July 28, 2009.  
September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale  
One sale, notified on September 14, 2011, is increasingly controversial because it was announced 
seven months after the unrest began, and has been agreed to despite U.S. criticism of Bahrain’s 
crackdown. It is for a proposed sale of 44 “Humvee” (M115A1B2) armored vehicles and several 
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hundred TOW missiles of various models, of which 50 are to be “bunker busters.” Along with 
associated equipment and support, the proposed sale is worth an estimated $53 million.  
Although not considered large in dollar terms, or of particularly sophisticated equipment, the sale 
incurred opposition from several human rights groups and from the Bahraini opposition who 
assert that the sale represents U.S. downplaying of the abuses committed by the Bahraini 
government in the course of the unrest. Human rights groups and Bahraini opposition figures say 
the regime could use the Humvees, in particular, in their efforts to crack down on protests. When 
the sale was announced, State Department officials said the sale would not violate the intent of 
the “Leahy amendment”—a provision of foreign aid and defense appropriations laws that forbids 
U.S. sales of equipment to security units that have committed human rights abuses. 25  
Two joint resolutions were introduced in the 112th Congress to block the sale: S.J.Res. 28, 
introduced by Senator Ron Wyden, and H.J.Res. 80, introduced by Representative James 
McGovern. Both joint resolutions would prohibit the sale unless the Administration certifies that 
Bahrain is rectifying the alleged abuses connected to its suppression of the uprising in 2011. To 
block a proposed arms sale would require passage of a joint resolution to do so, and with a veto-
proof majority, because President Obama could veto a joint resolution of disapproval in order to 
complete the sale. The House bill attracted 14 co-sponsors, the Senate bill two co-sponsors. On 
October 19, 2011, even though the sale had passed the period of congressional review, and 
apparently addressing the criticism and legislative initiatives, the Administration told Congress it 
would delay the sale until it could review the BICI report to be released November 23. Still, the 
State Department Spokesperson stated on January 27, 2012, that “we are maintaining a pause on 
most security assistance to Bahrain pending further progress on reform”—an indication that the 
Humvee and TOW sale remains on hold. However, at the same briefing, the Department said it 
was releasing to Bahrain previously notified and cleared spare parts and maintenance—worth a 
reported $1 million – needed for Bahrain’s external defense and support of Fifth Fleet operations. 
None of the items can be used against protesters, according to the State Dept. statement. 26  
Some of the most recent sales are in accordance with the State Department’s “Gulf Security 
Dialogue,” begun in 2006 to counter Iran, and under which a total of about $20 billion worth of 
U.S. weapons might be sold to the Gulf monarchy states. Only a small portion of that total sales 
volume is reportedly slated for Bahrain.  
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation 
Bahrain’s cooperation in post-September 11 regional security operations was discussed above. As 
far as terrorists operating inside Bahrain itself, the State Department’s report on international 
terrorism for 2010 (released August 18, 2011) again credits Bahrain for having “worked to 
actively counter terrorist finance,” as well as for enhanced border control capabilities, for a 
realignment of institutional responsibilities that resulted in greater capacity and interagency 
cooperation, and for successfully prosecuting a number of cases under its 2006 counterterrorism 
law. The report for 2010 dropped the criticism of the previous year’s report that Bahrain had not 
overcome legal constraints that have sometimes hampered its ability to detain and prosecute 
suspected terrorists.  
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Bahrain also continues to host the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force 
(MENA/FATF) secretariat and its Central Bank, Financial Information Unit (within the Central 
Bank), and local banks cooperate with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing and money 
laundering. As noted by the State Department in the FY2012 budget justification, some of the 
U.S. assistance to Bahrain (NADR funds) are used to provide training to its counter-terrorism 
institutions and to augment the ability of Bahraini forces to protect U.S. diplomatic and military 
facilities in Bahrain. The Bahraini Ministry of Interior is the lead agency that receives this support 
and, according to the FY2012 budget justification, the Administration is “reviewing” the use of 
this aid to ensure that none was used “against protestors” in the 2011 unrest.  
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran  
As noted previously, Bahrain focuses its foreign policy intently on Iran, which has purportedly 
demonstrated an ability to influence Bahrain’s domestic security to a greater degree than has any 
other regional power. Bahrain’s government perceives Iran as willing and able to support Shiite 
groups against Bahrain’s Sunni-dominated government.  
The issue of alleged Iranian involvement in the 2011 unrest has risen to the surface of the debate 
in Bahrain and the United States. Ambassador Krajeski (see above) testified on September 21, 
2011 that the United States “saw no evidence of Iranian instigation” of the unrest, but that the 
United States is concerned “about Iranian exploitation” of it. U.S. officials reportedly believe that 
Iran has urged hardline Bahraini Shiite factions not to compromise.27 On April 14, 2011, U.S. 
officials, speaking on background, told journalists that Tehran is debating how much aid, if any, 
to provide to Bahrain’s opposition, and that there was some information to indicate that Iran 
might have transferred small amounts of weapons to Bahraini oppositionists.28  
The BICI findings appear to absolve Iran of direct involvement in the 2011 unrest, although the 
report blames Iran’s media for incitement of the situation in Bahrain. Bahraini leaders have not 
directly contradicted the report’s findings on these points but they clearly believe that Iran’s role 
has been more extensive than that cited by the BICI report. On March 21, 2011, King Hamad 
indirectly accused Iran of involvement in the unrest by saying a “foreign plot” had been foiled by 
the GCC assistance and on April 17, 2011, the Bahraini government sent a letter to U.N. 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon formally alleging that the pro-Iranian Shiite faction Hezbollah is 
seeking to destabilize Bahrain with “logistical help” from unnamed countries (but clearly 
referring to Iran). The two countries withdrew their ambassadors in mid-March 2011. In an event 
that gave the Bahraini government some justification for its criticism, on May 16, 2011, Iranian 
warships began an effort to transport 150 pro-Bahrain opposition Iranian Shiites to Bahrain, but 
turned back the following day for fear of provoking a clash with GCC ships. This event came two 
days after Iran’s Foreign Minister praised a speech by King Hamad that appeared intended to 
lower tensions with Iran by “offering friendship” to Tehran. The foreign ministers of the two 
countries held talks on September 27, 2011, at the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly 
meetings in New York.  
Well before the 2011 unrest, Bahrain’s fears about Iran had been infused by lingering suspicions, 
sometimes fed by Iranian actions, that Iran never accepted the results of the 1970 U.N. survey 
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giving Bahrain independence rather than integration with Iran. Those findings were endorsed by 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 278, which was ratified by Iran’s parliament. After these 
official determinations, Bahrain had considered the issue closed, after over a century of Persian 
contestation of Bahraini sovereignty. Those contests included an effort by Reza Shah Pahlavi of 
Iran in the 1930s to deny Bahrain the right to grant oil concessions to the United States and 
Britain. In December 1981, and then again in June 1996—a time when Iran was actively seeking 
to export its Islamic revolution—Bahrain publicly accused Iran of trying to organize a coup by 
pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites (the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, IFLB). The group’s 
successor is the Bahrain Islamic Action Society, which is outlawed. 
In recent years, Bahrain’s leadership—and other countries in the region—have reacted strongly 
against statements by Iranian editorialists and advisers to Iranian leaders appearing to reassert 
Iran’s claim. One such example was a July 2007 Iranian newspaper article reasserting the Iranian 
claim to Bahrain. However, that article, along with the Bahraini Crown Prince’s November 3, 
2007, comment that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon (Iran claims it is developing only 
civilian nuclear power), did not mar the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad on November 17, 
2007. In March 2009 by former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, now an advisor 
to Iran’s Supreme Leader, again referring to Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province. Iran’s Foreign 
Ministry immediately tried to limit any diplomatic damage by asserting respect for Bahrain’s 
sovereignty and independence, but some Arab governments sharply criticized the Nateq Nuri 
comments. Morocco broke relations with Iran as a response.  
In connection with its own concerns about Iran, Bahrain has supported the U.S. position that Iran 
is not fully cooperating with U.N. Security Council requirements to verifiably demonstrate that its 
nuclear program is not a cover for a nuclear weapons program. In the joint news conference with 
Secretary Clinton on December 3, 2010, referenced earlier, the foreign minister restated Bahrain’s 
support for Iran’s right to nuclear power for peaceful uses. However, it stated forthright that 
“when it comes to taking that [nuclear] power, to developing it into a cycle for weapon grade, that 
is something that we can never accept, and we can never live with in this region.”29  
At the same time, so as not to provide Iran a pretext to pressure Bahrain, Bahrain’s leaders have 
sometimes tried to silence voices in Bahrain that publicly attack Iran. An example is the one-day 
suspension in 2009 of the newspaper Akhbar al Khaleej (Gulf News) for running an editorial by a 
Bahrain Shura Council member who criticized Iranian leaders. Bahrain regularly supports the 
invitation of high-ranking Iranian officials to the annual International Institute for Security 
Studies (IISS) conference in Bahrain called the “Manama Dialogue,” held every December. At 
times, there have been expectations that U.S. officials might meet with Iranian officials at the 
margins of the conference, although such meetings have not taken place in practice. Iranian 
officials have sometimes been known to cancel their travel to the meeting on short notice, 
particularly if they sense that the conference will feature U.S. or other criticism of Iran. 
Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties 
Another way in which Bahrain stays engaged with Iran is through discussions of major energy 
projects with Iran and by conducting normal trade and banking ties with it. The 2007 
Ahmadinejad visit resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet 
                                                                 
29 Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3, 
2010.  
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per day (for 25 years) of Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be built. The deal would have 
involved a $4 billion investment by Bahrain to develop Phases 15 and 16 of Iran’s South Pars gas 
field, which presumably would be the source of the gas that Bahrain would import. The March 
2009 comments of Nateq Nuri, discussed above, led to the suspension of this deal. On October 
21, 2009, Bahrain’s Minister of Oil and Gas Abd al-Husayn Mirza said talks on the deal would 
“resume soon.” There is a widespread assumption that the 2011 unrest has clouded the prospects 
for the deal, but Bahraini officials said in June 2011 that it has not been cancelled outright.  
There are no indications that Iran-Bahrain commerce has been affected by the 2011 unrest. 
Energy market observers say that Bahrain energy firms are still supplying gasoline to Iran. No 
U.N. Security Council Resolution bars such sales, but a U.S. law signed on July 1, 2010—the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-
195)—provides for sanctions against foreign firms that sell more than $1 million worth of 
gasoline to Iran. Some energy firms in the Gulf, including in Kuwait, reportedly have become 
reticent to continue supplying gasoline to Iran because of the U.S. action, but Bahrain is not 
known to have publicly disavowed further gasoline sales to Iran.30  
In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered in 
Bahrain, because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions, under 
Executive Order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in 
transactions with Future Bank and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank assets. The Bank 
remains in operation.  
Other Foreign Policy Issues 
Bahrain has close relations with the other GCC states, in particular Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by 
its turn to Saudi Arabia to help it deal with the 2011 unrest. Virtually all the GCC states have 
political structures similar to that of Bahrain, and several have substantial Shiite minorities 
(although not majorities, as Bahrain does). Saudi Arabia’s Shiites (about 10% of the population) 
are located mostly in the eastern provinces, across a causeway constructed in 1986 that connects 
the two countries. This linkage partly explains Saudi concerns about the unrest shaking the royal 
family in Bahrain. The Saudi commitment to Bahrain’s government could explain its push, at the 
December 2011 GCC summit, to turn the GCC into a political union (“Riyadh Declaration”)—
doing so would further commit all the GCC states to ensuring that Shiites do not come to power 
in Bahrain.  
Because of historic property and other ties between their two royal families Kuwait was briefly 
touted as a potential mediator in the Bahraini political crisis. Kuwaiti Shiites in Kuwait’s 
parliament have argued against Kuwait’s siding firmly with the Al Khalifa regime. However, the 
Kuwaiti government has, as noted with its naval deployments, joined the GCC position on the 
side of the government. Kuwait’s prime minister visited Bahrain on July 5, 2011.  
On other regional issues, unlike Qatar and UAE, Bahrain did not play a significant role in 
assisting the Libyan opposition to the rule of Colonel Muammar Al Qadhafi. Had Bahrain 
intervened in Libya, doing so could have been viewed as a contradiction—supporting a 
revolutionary movement in another Arab state while arguing that its domestic opposition’s 
                                                                 
30 CRS conversations with foreign diplomats, including some from the Gulf. July–September 2010.  
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grievances lacked legitimacy and that the opposition was beholden to Iran. In August 2011, 
Bahrain joined Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in withdrawing its Ambassador to Syria, probably 
because Syria is Iran’s main Middle Eastern ally and Bahrain wanted to signal retaliation for what 
it claims is Iranian intervention in Bahrain’s internal affairs. It closed its embassy there, along 
with the other GCC states, in January 2012 when the U.N. Security Council failed to act on a 
resolution demanding President Bashar al-Assad yield to a transition of power. As part of the CC, 
Bahrain joined the GCC efforts, which yielded success in November 2011, to persuade Yemen’s 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to cede power to a transition process.  
Qatar Territorial Disputes31 
The United States cooperates closely with both Qatar and Bahrain, which is why the Bahrain-
Qatar territorial dispute was closely watched by U.S. policymakers. The resolution of the dispute 
has partly removed these tensions as an issue for U.S. Gulf policy. Qatar, like Bahrain, is a GCC 
monarchy; however, their relations have been sometimes acrimonious because of territorial 
disputes with roots in the 18th century, when the ruling families of both countries controlled parts 
of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar-Bahrain relations have improved since an International Court of 
Justice ruled on March 16, 2001, on the disputes. The ICJ ruled in favor of Qatar on some of the 
issues, and in favor of Bahrain on others, but the central dispute—over the Hawar Islands—was 
decided in favor of Bahrain. Qatar expressed disappointment over the ruling but said it accepted it 
as binding, and the two have since muted mutual criticism and cooperated on major regional 
issues. The territorial disputes were referred to the ICJ by Qatar in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in 
which Qatar landed military personnel on a man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) that was in dispute, 
and took some Bahrainis prisoner. Saudi mediation in the 1986-1991 period proved fruitless. That 
reef was awarded to Qatar in the ICJ ruling. However, the ICJ ruled against Bahrain’s claim to the 
town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some members of the Al Khalifa family were long 
buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and Hadd Janan, were ruled not part of the Hawar Islands 
group and were awarded to Qatar.  
Arab-Israeli Issues 
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has not been as significant a mediator or broker as have its 
larger neighbors in the Gulf or broader Middle East. Bahrain has not taken a leading role in recent 
efforts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah to rebuild Palestinian unity, for example. On the other hand, 
Bahrain is not inactive on the issue: On July 16, 2009, Crown Prince Salman authored an op-ed 
calling on the Arab states to do more to communicate directly with the Israeli people on their 
ideas for peaceful resolution of the dispute.32 Following on that idea, on October 1, 2009, the 
foreign minister called for direct talks with Israel. In the previously cited December 3, 2010, joint 
press conference with the foreign minister, Secretary of State Clinton expressed appreciation for 
Bahrain’s support of Palestinian Authority leaders who are trying to build viable institutions and 
rule of law in the Palestinian territories. However, like most Arab states, Bahrain is supporting the 
efforts of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to obtain U.N. recognition for a State 
of Palestine, despite U.S. opposition to granting such recognition without an overall Palestinian 
peace settlement with Israel. 
                                                                 
31 See The Estimate. Dossier: The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision, Part 1 and Part 2. March 
23, 2001, and April 6, 2001.  
32 “Arabs Need to Talk to the Israelis.” The Washington Post. July 16, 2009.  
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Earlier, Bahrain participated in the 1990-1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and it hosted a 
session on the environment (October 1994). Bahrain did not follow Oman and Qatar in 
exchanging trade offices with Israel. In September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing 
secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel while retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott). 
In conjunction with the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and closed 
boycott-related offices in Bahrain.  
Still, the Arab-Israeli dispute always has the potential to become a political issue within Bahrain. 
Islamist hard-liners in Bahrain have accused the government of trying to “normalize” relations 
with Israel, citing the government’s sending a delegate to the November 27, 2007, summit on 
Middle East peace in Annapolis, the foreign minister’s meeting with Israeli officials at U.N. 
meetings in September 2007, and its October 2009 proposal of a “regional organization” that 
would group Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states. That proposal has not been implemented to 
date. In late October 2009, the elected COR passed a bill making it a crime (punishable by up to 
five years in jail) for Bahrainis to travel to Israel or hold talks with Israelis. The bill, which has 
not proceeded to become law (concurrence by the upper house, and acceptance by the King), 
apparently was a reaction to a visit by Bahraini officials to Israel in July 2009. The visit was to 
obtain the release of five Bahrainis taken prisoner by Israel when it seized a ship bound with 
goods for Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas. In June 2010, Sunni and Shiite Islamists in 
Bahrain held a demonstration to denounced the Israeli seizure of a ship in a flotilla intended to 
run the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip. 
Economic Issues 
Like the other Gulf states, Bahrain was affected by the international financial crisis of 2008-2009, 
but perhaps to a lesser extent than the wealthier states of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. 
Bahrain did not experience the construction and real estate “bubble” to the degree that this 
occurred in, for example, UAE. It is also apparently being affected by the 2011 unrest; in May 
2011 Moody’s, a bond rating agency, downgraded the quality of Bahrain’s bonds, thereby costing 
the government more to borrow funds. Bahrain had been hoping the unrest would not force 
cancellation of a high-profile, funds-generating Formula One auto race in October 2011, but race 
organizers decided not to hold the event from Bahrain.  
Bahrain has little cushion to deal with economic downturns. It has the lowest oil and gas reserves 
of the Gulf monarchy states, estimated respectively at 210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion 
cubic feet of gas. Some economic statistics are presented in Table 2. Without the ample oil or gas 
resources of its neighbors, Bahrain has diversified its economy by emphasizing banking and 
financial services (about 25.5% of GDP). At current rates of production (35,000 barrels per day of 
crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves will be exhausted in 15 years, but Saudi Arabia shares 
equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels per day produced from the offshore Abu Safa field. The 
United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain; the major U.S. import from it is aluminum. 
Aluminum and other manufacturing sectors in Bahrain account for the existence in Bahrain of a 
vibrant middle and working class among its citizens. However, these classes are largely 
composed of Shiites, and this has made many Shiites envious of the “ownership class” of Sunni 
Muslims. On the other hand, many Shiites own businesses and have done well economically.  
To encourage reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed an FTA 
on September 14, 2004. Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). 
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However, in light of the unrest, the AFL-CIO has urged the United States to void the FTA on the 
grounds that Bahrain is preventing free association of workers and abridging their rights.  
In 2010, the United States exported $1.25 billion worth of goods to Bahrain, and imported $420 
million in goods from that country. In 2005, total bilateral trade was about $780 million, 
suggesting that trade has expanded significantly following the FTA.  
Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain 
Population About 740,000, of which 503,000 are citizens 
Religions 81% Muslim, 9% Christian, 10% other 
GDP (purchasing power parity) $28 billion (2009) 
Budget $5.81 billion revenues, $5.86 billion expenditures (2009) 
External Debt  $11 billion (2009) 
Inflation Rate 3% (2009) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 2.9% in 2009, down from over 6% in 2008  
Size of Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF) About 13,000, plus about 1,200 National Guard. Some personnel 
are expatriates, including other Arab and Pakistani.  
Source: CIA, The World Factbook. 
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain 
($ in millions) 





FMF  90.0 24.6 18.847 15.593 14.998 3.968 8.0 19.0 15.46 10.0 10.0 
IMET 0.448 0.600 0.649 0.651 0.616 0.622 .661 .670 .435 .700 .725 
NADR    1.489 2.761 .776 0.744 .500 1.10 1.5 .500 .45 
“Section 
1206”    5.3 24.54 4.3 16.2   
  
Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military 
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related 
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section 1206 are DOD 
funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s special forces, its coastal surveillance and patrol capabilities, and to 
develop its counter terrorism assessment capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense 
Authorization Act, P.L. 109-163.) FY2008 funds derived from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-252), and the 
Consolidated appropriation (P.L. 110-329). FY2009 funds included funding from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-
252) as well as regular appropriation (P.L. 111-8). FY2010 funds are from Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-
117). FY2011 funds are appropriated by P.L. 112-10, Continuing Appropriations for FY2011.  
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